POST-UPRISING BANGLADESH: Core political challenges

THE question of whether political parties should remain deeply divided or pursue a path of conditional alignment is no longer a mere academic exercise in Bangladesh; it has become the central dilemma determining the fate of the nation following the historic July 2024 mass uprising. This debate is acutely relevant for all key political forces operating within the fragile transitional period.

 

 

Ideological rifts and historical mistrust are powerful forces that push political rivals towards mutual criticism and isolation. However, a vast and consistent body of academic research indicates that prolonged and intense division creates catastrophic negative externalities on social trust, economic stability and institutional integrity. Studies in comparative political science and political economy clarify that how political forces choose to compete for the nation’s sustainable, developed future is just as important as what they ideologically believe. This realisation brings to the forefront the critical question of the moment: Is the habitual division among parties truly beneficial for political momentum, or is a principle-based, conditional alignment more effective for consolidating the gains of the uprising and stabilizing the society and economy?

 

 

 

Perils of fragmented politics

 

 

POLITICAL theorists have long established that competition is a democratic necessity, but permanent, existential hostility is a path to political decay.

 

 

Robert Putnam, in his seminal work ‘Making Democracy Work’ (1993), demonstrated that political rivalry becomes fundamentally destructive when it undermines the necessary social infrastructure of cooperation and trust, which he termed ‘bridging social capital.’ His research on Italian regional governance showed that in regions where political forces engaged in both competition and cooperation, institutions were robust and economic outcomes improved. Conversely, where politics was conflict-ridden and dominated by ‘zero-sum mindset’, institutions floundered.

 

 

Bangladesh’s political history has been a textbook case of this destructive pattern. The prevailing ‘winner-takes-all’ culture, characterised by a refusal to share power or respect the opposition’s legitimacy, systematically destroyed bridging social capital. The result was a political environment where rivals were viewed not as competitors but as an existential threat to be eliminated. In the post-uprising environment, this tendency towards fragmentation remains a formidable threat. The very process of forming a unified strategy among the opposition, evidenced by internal dissent or splits within forces like the NCP over issues such as electoral alliances or strategic participation, shows how entrenched division can handicap a unified reform agenda. This political fragmentation diverts focus from the monumental task of institutional rebuilding to internal bickering and positional struggle.

 

 

 

 

From party cohesion to national unity

 

 

PUTNAM’S idea of bridging social capital finds an ancient resonance in Ibn Khaldun’s ‘asabiyah’ (group solidarity or social cohesion). In his timeless work, ‘Al-Muqaddimah’, Khaldun argued that strong asabiyah, cohesion built around a shared purpose or set of customs, is essential for a group or nation to gain power and sustain its dominance.

 

 

Various political forces in Bangladesh possess powerful internal ‘party asabiyah,’ which stems from deep ideological beliefs, loyalty to powerful leaders or shared experiences of oppression. This internal cohesion keeps parties united in the face of adversity. However, the long history of division has caused this ‘party asabiyah’ to be directed against rival groups, deepening mutual hostility. The tragic outcome is a constant erosion of the ‘national asabiyah,’ the broader social trust and consensus required to run a state effectively.

 

 

When this trust diminishes, the legitimacy of key institutions is systematically reduced. Over time, state institutions the judiciary, the Election Commission, the administration, the security agencies and the anti-corruption bodies cease to be neutral arbiters and instead become tools for protecting the interests of specific groups and oligarchs. This is the definition of an extractive system, as meticulously detailed by Acemoglu and Robinson in ‘Why Nations Fail’. The July revolution successfully removed the ruling party that had entrenched this extractive system. However, the true, lasting challenge is replacing it with ‘inclusive institutions’, ones that broadly distribute power and establish meaningful constraints on its exercise. If the political forces remain fragmented and mutually hostile, they will be unable to agree on the fundamental, non-partisan reforms required to build these inclusive institutions, thereby risking a return to an extractive framework, albeit under new actors.

 

 

 

Institutional and economic costs

 

 

THE economic costs of intense political division are not theoretical; they are currently crippling the nation. Douglass North, in ‘Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance’ (1990), stressed that stable and predictable political institutions are absolutely vital for sustainable economic growth. When political conflict is intense and protracted, policy uncertainty skyrockets, increasing transaction costs, scaring off foreign direct investment and prompting capital flight.

 

 

The research by Alesina and Perotti (1996) further validates this, showing that political instability directly reduces investment. In today’s Bangladesh, the economic impact is clear: the political flux and continued disagreements over the reform roadmap are contributing to negative sovereign credit rating outlooks and frustrating the economic stabilisation efforts of the interim government.

 

 

More critically, the division impedes the reform agenda itself. The July 2024 uprising promised critical, deep structural changes, including achieving genuine judicial independence, overhauling the Election Commission’s structure, and depoliticising the bureaucracy. A hostile political landscape means that these reforms will inevitably be contested, delayed or watered down. If the major political forces cannot agree on the basic rules of the game before the next election, then the new democratic system, however achieved, will be founded on the same shaky ground as its predecessors.

 

 

 

Consensus for democratic sustainability

 

 

COMPARATIVE democratic theory offers a viable alternative to the destructive cycle. Arend Lijphart, in ‘Patterns of Democracy’ (2012), contrasted consensus democracy with the majoritarian, ‘winner-takes-all’ system. He demonstrated that systems designed to facilitate discussion, coalition formation and compromise consistently result in more stable policies, stronger institutions and greater social inclusion. Crucially, consensus does not eliminate competition; rather, it confines competition within a framework of shared rules and institutional bargaining, which is the definition of Acemoglu and Robinson’s inclusive politics.

 

 

For Bangladesh, an ‘alignment’ does not imply the permanent integration of ideologically disparate parties. Instead, it must be a conditional pact on minimum democratic principles and national priorities. This pact requires all major forces the BNP, Jamaat, NCP, and any other significant players to commit to non-violent political engagement and the mandate to implement deep, difficult and potentially unpopular structural and state institutional reforms.

 

 

Such a consensus on norms a national asabiyah for democracy and development is the only way to reduce political violence, rebuild social trust and create the predictable environment that economic investment requires. The challenge for Bangladesh is not to eliminate rivalry, but to responsibly manage it within a framework of shared rules and mutual restraint. By nurturing a ‘positive-sum mindset’ to forge a conditional alignment focused on national interest and institutional integrity, the political forces can finally provide a sustainable, inclusive path forward.

 

 

 

Mostafizur Rahman is an economist at North South University. Dr Ishrat Hossain is dean, School of Business, Uttara University; former faculty of economics at Qatar University and former research fellow at the University of Technology Sydney, Australia.