How Bangladesh will be impacted by US national security strategy

The 2025 National Security Strategy (NSS) released by the US in December has significant ramifications for Bangladesh, beyond just foreign policy. The Trump administration's early months strategy emphasizes structural exclusion, eliminating ambiguity about "competition" with China. This approach will impact the strategic environment for smaller Indo-Pacific countries. Bangladesh, at the crossroads of global power struggles, faces unique opportunities and diplomatic challenges with the new US national security strategy.

The 2025 NSS prioritizes the Indo-Pacific as an essential economic and geopolitical arena in the 21st century, alongside the Western Hemisphere, as an American strategic priority. The documentemphasizes preventing Chinese dominance through deterrence, supply chain diversification, and mineral security, highlighting Bangladesh's position as a labour factory and gateway to South and Southeast Asia. The doctrine addresses Taiwan eight times, showing the US commitment to military intervention if China takes action. With this clarity, the Taiwan issue becomes a clear red line, raising the stakes for regional parties navigating between Washington and Beijing.

Recent developments in Bangladesh, under the interim administration of Chief Adviser Muhammad Yunus, highlight the risks of the new American approach. In July 2025, the Trump administration imposed a 35% tariff on Bangladeshi goods, accusing New Dhaka of benefiting from China's "trade deficit disparity" in a letter to Dr. Muhammad Yunus. This action aligned with the NSS's goal of reducing global trade dependence on China. Bangladesh is vulnerable to tariff imposition, according to the NSS' logic: 26.4% of its imports originate in China, and over 80% of those commodities are used for garment production. As the Trump administration aims to contain China's contribution to the global economy through economic measures, the Rules of Origin are likely to become important, and stricter rules are likely to follow, which would pose a significant challenge for countries like Bangladesh.

The Bangladesh-US security conversation has dramatically increased since the Yunus administration. In June 2025, Chief Adviser Yunus and US Secretary of State Marco Rubio discussed increasing economic connections and promoting security and stability in the Indo-Pacific during a conversation. The friendly wording masks harsher realities: Washington anticipates that Bangladesh will actively support American efforts to restrict China, including through increased defence cooperation and supply chain shifts. In December 2025, Yunus and then-US Special Envoy Sergio Gor discussed trade and tariff negotiations, the approaching general election, and Bangladesh's political transition, demonstrating the interconnectedness of security, trade, and democracy in U.S. control over Bangladesh.

By 2025, the US-Bangladesh defence cooperation will have become almost like an alliance, reflecting the NSS's focus on burden-sharing and regional deterrence. During "Operation Pacific Angel 25-3" in Chattogram in September, 150 Bangladeshi Air Force personnel and 92 Americans received joint training on disaster response, medical readiness, and air safety. The Tiger Lightning 2025 Army training at Sylhet, featuring the US Army Pacific Command and the Nevada National Guard, included counter-terrorism and jungle warfare for six days. Naval Engagement Activity (NEA) Bangladesh 2025, held in October at Chattogram, brought together US and Bangladesh Navy personnel for maritime security training. In particular, the U.S. is expanding RQ-21 Blackjack Unmanned Aerial System capabilities with the Bangladesh Army and Navy, enhancing marine domain awareness and border surveillance. Despite significant operational synergy, Bangladesh has not signed the GSOMIA and ACSA, which the US has been urging since 2012 to develop a "capable" Bangladeshi armed force by 2030.

The "US Indo-Pacific Strategy" aims to correct this imbalance by shifting major economies away from China and encouraging Beijing to prioritize domestic consumption. Bangladesh faces economic realities: China remains its top import destination, and strengthening security ties with the US could threaten supply chains. By setting high Rules of Origin at 40% local value addition, the Trump administration effectively demanded that Bangladesh transform its garment sector or face reduced tariff preference. This de facto unilateral trade pact violates World Trade Organization (WTO)"Most Favoured Nation" rules, proving the White House's political commercial policy rather than an economic one. In September 2025 negotiations, Bangladeshi authorities revealed that the US demanded "alignment with American tariff interests" to replace WTO neutrality with "US containment of China."

Meanwhile, in June 2025, Bangladesh established a trilateral with Pakistan and China in Kunming to counterbalance geopolitical drift. The three countries are committed to promoting cooperation based on "good-neighbourliness, equality, and mutual trust. New Delhi is concerned about Dhaka's strategic reassessment. Observations by Chief Adviser Prof. Dr. Muhammad Yunus that India's Northeast was "landlocked" and dependent on Bangladesh ports caused diplomatic friction. The interim government has strengthened ties with Pakistan by allowing visa-free travel for holders of diplomatic passports and direct marine connections, both previously prohibited under Hasina's rule. Recent developments suggest Bangladesh is shifting its regional attitude, potentially seeking greater independence from India and strengthening ties with Beijing and Islamabad. Bangladesh is seeking to balance such foreign relation with the US as well.

Bangladesh is using 360-degree diplomacy to navigate these challenging seas by increasing contact with middle powers. Turkey, Italy, Brazil, and South Korea offer alternatives to major-power pressure, including defencecollaboration, technology transfer, and co-production, without the geopolitical strings attached to Washington, Beijing, or New Delhi. Bangladesh might bridge the global North and South with this diversification policy, enabling strategic autonomy. Bangladesh could maintain negotiating strength amid growing great-power rivalry by valuing multiple powers rather than relying on a single one.

The February 12, 2026, general elections will mark a significant shift in Bangladesh's foreign policy. The Yunus Interim government has maintained amicable relations with the US, achieved tariff cuts, and defence cooperation without losing strategic autonomy. However, tensions persist: Bangladesh's economy relies on Chinese and American markets, while American security strategy demands that Bangladesh take sides in a great-power conflict. Washington's new National Security Strategy clearly states that Bangladesh must choose between extreme obedience and pressure to stay non-aligned. Bangladesh's approach to this challenge will impact its future prosperity and the ability of smaller states to maintain meaningful independence amid structural power rivalry.