Encountering ‘unconventional’ electoral violence

‘UNCONVENTIONAL’ election violence is likely to pose a great threat to the upcoming 13th parliament election of 2026. The question is — are we prepared to encounter such violences?

 

 

Let’s start finding the answer by looking back at the nature, extent and magnitudes of electoral violence since 2013. The year 2013 is the starting point for a reason. The year stood as Bangladesh’s deadliest year of pre-election political violence since independence. According to an Ain O Salish Kendra report, 2013 violence resulted in 848 recorded clashes, 507 deaths and approximately 22,407 injuries. The violence included systematic arson and deliberate sabotage of mobility (through hartals and blockades) across the country.

 

 

 

The 2013 electoral violence numbers are not mere statistics; they serve as a stark warning that senseless violence can pave the way for misrule and tyranny. The bloodshed failed to deliver the hoped-for reforms in law and order that citizens demanded. Instead, it enabled Sheikh Hasina’s government to internalise violence as a means of consolidating its oligarchic grip. Fundamental democratic principles — especially the citizens’ right to vote — were undermined.

 

 

The aftermath? A haunting memory of the January 2014 parliamentary election. The ruling party bagged 153 out of 300 seats uncontested. MPs declared elected without a single vote. They entered parliament with zero guilt or shame but fussy smiles. The citizens still wonder — if the ultimate goal was to secure ‘wins by default,’ why did the nation have to pay in blood and burn injuries?

 

 

Bangladesh once again stands at a pre-election crossroads. Unlike 2014, the context and concerns have shifted. Eleven years on, the risk landscape is more fragmented, unpredictable and networked.

 

 

The country now faces the prospect of neo-noir, unconventional violence — smaller in scale but sharper and more targeted. Leveraging widened opportunities of misinformation-disinformation routes and fake news and rumour channels — the violence masterminds might lead coordinated online-offline assassination management, arson, hate crimes, mobs, gang-war-type factional street power display and sabotage. Violence designs may aim not just at polling stations, but at paralysing public confidence itself. Such evolving risk environment compels us to anticipate ‘guerrilla-style’ disruptions, replacing the old arithmetic of hartals and blockades.

 

 

Recent incidents — the killing of Sharif Osman Hadi, the brutal lynching of Dipu Das, the chilling burning of baby Ayesha and her sister — echo the unrests of 2014, but with critical deviations. Between August 6 and September 22, 2024, BNP factions’ intra-party violence caused at least 14 killings. This is a sobering reminder that nomination battles and turf wars can fuel violence independently, even without any central party directive to unleash chaos. Attacks on media outlets and cultural institutions and the state’s scramble to regain control signal a new pattern: symbolic targets, viral mobilisation and rapid escalation have become hallmarks of the current unrest.Political party merchandise

 

A close examination of party violence reveals a clear shift in patterns from previous years. The days of direct Bangladesh Awami League versus Bangladesh Nationalist Party clashes are over. Violence has now fragmented into three distinct fronts: (1) Awami League’s vengeful, guerrilla-style campaigns targeting all anti-AL parties, including ordinary citizens; (2) BNP’s internal factional clashes, as members vie for political authority and electoral nominations; and (3) Jamaat and like-minded Islamist groups orchestrating cyber-attacks on intellectual and ideological opponents perceived as threats to their political narratives.

 

 

The Awami League has been barred from contesting future elections following the suspension of its registration by the Election Commission. A Reuters report of May 13, 2025 warned that the banning did not reduce the risk of violence and the fragility of the political transition. The ‘defeated forces,’ equipped with deep finances and external backing, are likely to escalate sabotage and destabilisation efforts.

 

 

During its tenure in power, the AL led the chart in political violence, with the BNP occasionally retaliating but rarely making a significant impact. Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami, heavily suppressed at the time, scarcely had the opportunity to engage in violence. Now, with the AL marginalised from the political scene, it coordinates violent activities from the underground.

 

 

Between 2009 and 2024, the AL popularised the ‘BNP-Jamaat’ label, effectively vilifying, demonising and branding the duo as ‘enemies of the nation,’ ‘terminators of the spirit of independence,’ and ‘pro-Pakistani’ elements. This sweeping narrative not only marginalised the two main opposition parties but also allowed the AL to monopolise state-led political violence under the guise of patriotism.

 

 

Currently, BNP- and Jamaat-led election alliances are consciously avoiding direct, field-level violence. Instead, their focus has shifted to cyber-activism: waging battles through creative online campaigns and social media-driven activism. While this appears to be a more peaceful form of engagement, the manufacturing of consent and manipulation of public opinion online is taking on a war-like intensity, with digital hostilities spilling onto the streets. Influencers are increasingly used not to inform, but to manipulate the perceptions of the uncritical masses.

 

 

Both major alliances have united in their opposition to Sheikh Hasina. However, these alliances remain fragile, frequently threatened by sudden, unconventional outbursts of violence that evade detection by state intelligence and law enforcement.

 

 

From a security-planning perspective, the government need not wait to ‘prove’ every allegation before acting prudently. It must plan proactively against threat vectors such as financing pipelines, sleeper mobilisation networks, coercive local enforcers and cross-border disinformation campaigns.

 

Electoral violence prevention

 

EMERGING risks associated with unconventional forms of electoral violence deserves immediate attention. As election day approaches rapidly, there is no luxury to await a miraculous solution. Now is the time to intensify electoral violence prevention efforts. At this critical juncture, insights from all corners of the nation are essential. This discussion lends food for thoughts — offering urgent, actionable recommendations for immediate implementation.

 

 

Sociologists suggest that the state of violence is not simply about ‘anger’; it is about organisation and opportunity. Collective violence is rarely spontaneous — it is often orchestrated by networks able to rapidly mobilise, exploit weak policing or predictable vulnerabilities, and legitimise their acts by labelling opponents as ‘traitors,’ ‘agents,’ or ‘enemies of faith’ or ‘enemies of nation.’ When policing fails, crowds acquire a dangerous habit: impunity becomes their instructor. Once this lesson is internalised, even minor provocations can spark disproportionate violence.

 

 

What practical steps can Bangladesh take to control electoral violence? A multi-layered election security network, rather than a singular reactive ‘operation’ involving following key layers is likely to yield a better remedy. Election security lies in critical infrastructure protection — layered, redundant, intelligence-led and publicly accountable. This could be achieved through the establishment of a national election security joint command, integrating police, intelligence, cyber units, BGB/coast guard (where relevant), and rapid-response medical and fire services. The goal is not militarisation, but coordination — to prevent local incidents from cascading into national crises.

 

 

The Election Commission is to immediately identify and map the ‘top security flashpoints,’ using past violence data and current factional trends to create a ranked list of nomination hotspots, transport choke points, arson corridors, vulnerable minority areas and high-risk media and civic sites. This could be combined with public awareness initiatives and robust citizen reporting channels. The government should publicly announce extra patrols, expedited prosecutions and dedicate hotlines for reporting threats. Prevention is most effective when it is visible and transparent.

 

 

Disrupting the arson economy must be a top priority. This requires fuel control, transport checks and thorough forensic follow-up. A modern response includes tighter regulation of fuel during the election period, widespread CCTV and ANPR (Automatic Number Plate Recognition) coverage on major highways, and rapid forensic linkage between incidents — identifying common accelerant patterns, transport routes and procurement sources.

 

 

The establishment of fast-track ‘election violence courts’ (temporary benches) is also essential. Impunity is the oxygen that fuels further violence. These special, time-limited benches — operating under transparent rules and with defence rights protected — can minimise the gap between offense and consequence, without creating opportunities for abuse.

 

 

Protection of media houses and civic institutions — key pillars of democracy — must be prioritised as attacks on major newspapers and cultural institutions have already happened amid the unrest. With dedicated security, perimeter hardening and rapid response teams, these sites should be safeguarded as critical election infrastructure.

 

 

A specialised cyber and disinformation cell must be trained and empowered to monitor, attribute and de-escalate threats swiftly and skilfully. In the digital age, an election can be derailed by rumours faster than by arson. The state should establish public fact-checking channels, enable rapid takedown requests wherever justified, preserve digital evidence (with chain-of-custody), and run ‘prebunking’ campaigns to educate citizens about manipulation tactics.

 

 

An election-day ‘golden hour’ protocol should be instituted. Most disasters escalate because the first hour is mismanaged. A clear protocol could involve: 15 minutes to isolate and secure the scene and preserve evidence; 30 minutes for public updates (facts only, no speculation); and 60 minutes to make arrests wherever warranted by evidence.

 

 

Another pertinent question: Should Bangladesh consider seeking UN assistance? The answer is ‘yes’ — other countries have benefited from UN support in electoral processes. This does not mean importing a foreign ‘occupation model.’ Rather, the UN has provided technical, logistical and security support in post-conflict states, enabling secure and credible elections.

 

 

However, Bangladesh is not in a situation akin to Cambodia in 1993 or Timor in 1999. The objective is not to ‘bring in UN troops,’ but to request technical electoral assistance for planning, logistics, training and knowledge transfer. Robust international observation and capacity-building for police in election security and digital forensics should also be sought — without compromising national sovereignty.

 

 

If Bangladesh seeks external support, the most credible approach is a UN-UNDP-style technical assistance package — emphasising training, coordination and integrity systems — rather than a peacekeeping presence. Ultimately, Bangladesh must choose between order with legitimacy and chaos with excuses. The year 2013 taught a harsh lesson: a nation can lose 507 lives and still end up with a parliament where 153 seats are decided without a vote. That is not politics — it is a social tragedy masquerading as due process.

 

 

Today’s threats are less predictable, more networked and highly symbolic. The government’s duty is not merely to ‘hold an election,’ but to protect the civic space where elections carry real meaning and legitimacy.

 

 

If the state fails to implement layered security systems, Bangladesh may confront a new iteration of violence — one that adapts old hartal-and-blockade tactics into assassination-to-riot cascades, arson-to-panic economics, and rumour-driven mob justice. Such a transition will erode legitimacy day by day. Years from now, the nation may again face the bitter question — what was the point of all that senseless bloodshed?

 

 

 

Dr Helal Mohiuddin is director of Research, Conflict and Resilience Research Institute, Canada (CRRIC) and liberal arts faculty at the Mayville State University, North Dakota, USA.